American Cancer Society:
The World's Wealthiest "Non-profit" Institution
The ACS is accumulating
great wealth in its role as a "charity." According
to James Bennett, professor of economics at George Mason University
and recognized authority on charitable organizations, the ACS
held a fund balance of over $400 million with about $69 million
of holdings in land, buildings, and equipment in 1988 (1). Of
that money, the ACS spent only $90 million --26 percent of its
budget-- on medical research and programs. The rest covered "operating
expenses," including about 60 percent for generous salaries,
pensions, executive benefits, and overhead. By 1989, the cash
reserves of the ACS were worth more than $700 million (2). In
1991, Americans, believing they were contributing to fighting
cancer, gave nearly $350 million to the ACS, 6 percent more than
the previous year. Most of this money comes from public donations
averaging $3,500, and high-profile fund raising campaigns such
as the springtime daffodil sale and the May relay races. However,
over the last two decades, an increasing proportion of the ACS
budget comes from large corporations, including the pharmaceutical,
cancer drug, telecommunications, and entertainment industries.
Track Record on Prevention
Marching
in lockstep with the NCI in its "war" on cancer is
its "ministry of information," the ACS. With powerful media control
and public relations resources, the ACS is the tail that wags
the dog of the policies and priorities of the NCI (7,8). In addition,
the approach of the ACS to cancer prevention reflects a virtually
exclusive "blame-the-victim" philosophy. It emphasizes faulty
lifestyles rather than unknowing and avoidable exposure to workplace
or environmental carcinogens. Giant corporations, which profit
handsomely while they pollute the air, water, and food with a
wide range of carcinogens, are greatly comforted by the silence
of the ACS. This silence reflects a complex of mindsets fixated
on diagnosis, treatment, and basic genetic research together
with ignorance, indifference, and even hostility to prevention,
coupled with conflicts of interest.
Indeed, despite promises to the
public to do everything to "wipe out cancer
in your lifetime," the ACS fails to make its voice heard in Congress and the
regulatory arena. Instead, the ACS repeatedly rejects or ignores opportunities
and requests from congressional committees, regulatory agencies, unions, and
environmental organizations to provide scientific testimony critical to efforts
to legislate and regulate a wide range of occupational and environmental carcinogens.
This history of ACS unresponsiveness is a long and damning one, as shown by
the following examples (6):
- In 1971, when studies unequivocally proved that diethylstilbestrol
(DES) caused vaginal cancers in teenaged daughters of women administered
the drug during pregnancy, the ACS refused an invitation to testify
at congressional hearings to require the FDA to ban its use as
an animal feed additive. It gave no reason for its refusal.
- In 1977 and 1978, the ACS opposed regulations proposed for
hair coloring products that contained dyes known to cause breast
and liver cancer in rodents in spite of the clear evidence of
human risk.
- In 1977, the ACS called
for a congressional moratorium on the FDA's proposed ban on
saccharin and even advocated its use
by nursing mothers and babies in "moderation" despite clear-cut
evidence of its carcinogenicity in rodents. This reflects the
consistent rejection by the ACS of the importance of animal evidence
as predictive of human cancer risk.
- In 1977 and 1978, the ACS opposed regulations proposed for
hair coloring products that contained dyes known to cause breast
cancer. In so doing, the ACS ignored virtually every tenet of
responsible public health as these chemicals were clear-cut liver
and breast carcinogens.
- In 1978, Tony Mazzocchi,
then senior representative of the Oil, Chemical, and Atomic
Workers International Union, stated
at a Washington, D.C., roundtable between public interest groups
and high-ranking ACS officials: "Occupational safety standards
have received no support from the ACS."
- In 1978, Congressman Paul
Rogers censured the ACS for doing "too
little, too late" in failing to support the Clean Air Act.
- In 1982, the ACS adopted a highly restrictive cancer policy
that insisted on unequivocal human evidence of carcinogenicity
before taking any position on public health hazards (pages 509-512).
Accordingly, the ACS still trivializes or rejects evidence of
carcinogenicity in experimental animals, and has actively campaigned
against laws (the 1958 Delaney Law, for instance) that ban deliberate
addition to food of any amount of any additive shown to cause
cancer in either animals or humans. The ACS still persists in
an anti-Delaney policy, in spite of the overwhelming support
for the Delaney Law by the independent scientific community (Appendix
VII).
- In 1983, the ACS refused to join a coalition of the March
of Dimes, American Heart Association, and the American Lung Association
to support the Clean Air Act.
- In 1992, the ACS issued
a joint statement with the Chlorine Institute in support of
the continued global use of organochlorine
pesticides -- despite clear evidence that some were known to
cause breast cancer. In this statement, Society Vice President
Clark Heath, M.D., dismissed evidence of this risk as "preliminary
and mostly based on weak and indirect association." Heath then
went on to explain away the blame for increasing breast cancer
rates as due to better detection: "Speculation that such exposures
account for observed geographic differences in breast cancer
incidence or for recent rises in breast cancer occurrence should
be received with caution; more likely, much of the recent rise
in incidence in the United States . . . reflects increased utilization
of mammography over the past decade."
- In 1992, in conjunction
with the NCI, the ACS aggressively launched a "chemoprevention" program aimed at recruiting 16,000
healthy women at supposedly "high risk'' of breast cancer into
a 5-year clinical trial with a highly profitable drug called
tamoxifen. This drug is manufactured by one of the world's most
powerful cancer drug industries, Zeneca, an offshoot of the Imperial
Chemical Industries (page 511 of Politics of Cancer- Revisited).
The women were told that the drug was essentially harmless, and
that it could reduce their risk of breast cancer. What the women
were not told was that tamoxifen had already been shown to be
a highly potent liver carcinogen in rodent tests, and also that
it was well-known to induce human uterine cancer (9).
- In 1993, just before PBS
Frontline aired the special entitled, "In
Our Children's Food," the ACS came out in support of the pesticide
industry. In a damage-control memorandum sent to some forty-eight
regional divisions, the ACS trivialized pesticides as a cause
of childhood cancer, and reassured the public that carcinogenic
pesticide residues in food are safe, even for babies. When the
media and concerned citizens called local ACS chapters, they
received reassurances from an ACS memorandum by its Vice President
for Public Relations: "The primary health hazards of pesticides
are from direct contact with the chemicals at potentially high
doses, for example, farm workers who apply the chemicals and
work in the fields after the pesticides have been applied, and
people living near aerially sprayed fields. . . . The American
Cancer Society believes that the benefits of a balanced diet
rich in fruits and vegetables far outweigh the largely theoretical
risks posed by occasional, very low pesticide residue levels
in foods." (10)
- In September 1996, the
ACS together with a diverse group of patient and physician
organizations, filed a "citizen's petition" to
pressure FDA to ease restrictions on access to silicone gel breast
implants. What the ACS did not disclose was that the gel in these
implants had clearly been shown to induce cancer in several industry
rodent studies, and that these implants were also contaminated
with other potent carcinogens such as ethylene oxide and crystalline
silica (pages 609-611 in the Politics of Cancer- Revisited).
References
1. J.T. Bennett. "Health research charities: Doing little in research but emphasizing
politics." Union Leader p.10, Manchester, New Hampshire, September 20, 1990.
2. J.T. Bennett and T.J. DiLorenzo. Unhealthy Charities: Hazardous
to Your Health and Wealth, Basic Books, New York, 1994.
3. H. Hall and G. Williams. "Professor vs. Cancer Society," The
Chronicle of Philanthropy, p.26, January 28, 1992.
4. T.J. DiLorenzo. "One charity's uneconomic war on cancer," Wall
Street Journal, March 15, 1992, A10.
5. J.D. Salant. "Cancer society gives to governors," A.
P. Release, March 30, 1998.
6. S.S. Epstein, D. Steinman, and S. LeVert. The Breast Cancer
Prevention Program, p. 306-314, MacMillan, USA, 1997.
7. S.S. Epstein, "Losing the war against cancer: Who's to blame
and what to do about it," International Journal of Health Services
20:53-71, 1990.
8. S.S. Epstein. "Evaluation of the National Cancer Program
and proposed reforms," International Journal of Health Services
23(1):15-44, 1993.
9. The Breast Cancer Prevention Program, p. 145-15 1.
10. American Cancer Society. "Upcoming television special on
pesticides in food." Memorandum from S. Dickinson, Vice-President,
Public Relations and Health, to Clark W. Heath, Jr., M.D., Vice-President,
Epidemiology and Statistics, March 22, 1993.
11. American Cancer Society,
Cancer Facts & Figures _ 1998,
p. 1-32, 1998.
12. The Breast Cancer Prevention Program, Chapter 6.
13. The Breast Cancer Prevention Program, p. 311-314.
14. S. Kaplan. "PR Giant Makes Hay from Client 'Cross-pollination':
Porter/Novelli plays all sides," PR Watch, First quarter, 11994:4.
15. S. Kaplan. "Porter-Novelli plays all sides," Legal
Times 16(27):1, November 2 3, 1993.
16. R.W. Moss. Questioning Chemotherapy, Equinox Press, Brooklyn,
New York, 1995.
17. U. S. Congress Office
of Technology Assessment (OTA). "Unconventional
cancer treatments," U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington,
D.C., 1990.
18. R.W. Moss. Cancer Therapy: The Independent Consumer's Guide
To Non-toxic Treatment and Prevention, Equinox Press, Brooklyn,
New York, 1992. See also the Moss Reports on alternative and
complementary cancer treatments. (Tel: 718-636-4433: Fax: 718-636-0186.)
19. L. Castellucci. "Practitioners Seek Common Ground in Unconventional
Forum," J. Nat. Cancer Inst., 90:1036-1037, 1998.
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